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Mar. 17, 19:J3.]

GEOHGE FARBER, an Incompetent Person, etc., Appellant,
v. DAVID M. OLKON et al., Respondents.
[1] Parent and Child-Care of Adult Child.-A father is required
by law to care for and maintain an incompetent adult child.
(Civ. Code, §206.)
[2] Physicians-Relation to Patient--Operating With or Without
Consent of Parent.-In case of an emergency a surgeon may
operate on a minor child without waiting for authority from
the parents where it appears impracticable to secure it, but
in the absence of an emergency the parent of such a child
may lawfully consent to the operation.
[3] !d.-Relation to Patient-Operating With or Without Consent of Parent.-Where an adult child is incompetent and
has no legally appointed guardian, the right to consent to
an operation on such child resides in the parent who has the
legal responsibility to maintain the child.
[ 4] Hospitals and Asylums- Liability- Assault and Battery.Where state h0spital pursuant to father's request paroled
mental patient to a licensed private mental institution which
was authorized to furnish medical and custodial care to
patient, and condition of such patient had gradually deteriorated following a lobotomy. such institution and a physician
thereof were justified in proceeding with electroshock treatments in reliance on terms of the parole and father's signed
consent, and such treatments did not constitute an unlawful
assault or battery on the patient's body.
[5] Id.-Regulation.-Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5750, prohibiting detainment of involuntary patient in a private mental institution except on certificate of a doctor who has no financial
interest in such institution, does not apply where patient is
paroled direct to such institution by Department of Institutions.
[6] Physicians- Malpractice- Res Ipsa Loquitur.- Doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applies in medical malpractice cases only
where a layman is able to say as a matter of common know!-

[1] See Cal.Jur., Parent and Child, § 15; Am.Jur., Parent and
Child, § 68.
[6] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Physicians and Surgeons, § 41; Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 127.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Parent and Child,§ 17; [2, 3] Physicians, § 45.1; [ 4] Hospitals and Asylums, § 8; [5] Hospitals and
Asylums, § 7; [6, 7] Physicians, §56; [8] Physicians, § 56(3).
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edge and observation, or from the evidence can draw an
inference, that the consequences of professional treatment
were not such as ordinarily would have followed if due care
had been exercised.
[7] !d.-Malpractice-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In action for damages
for broken femur bones resulting from alleged negligent administration of electroshock treatments, doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is not applicable where the machine used in giving
such treatments was in good working order and where fractures, which commonly occur in this form of treatment notwithstanding any kind of precaution or care that can be
taken to prevent them, constitute a calculated or even an
expected risk of the treatment; hence opinions of experts
are required to evaluate the procedures and hazards of shock
treatment in a particular case.
[8] Id.-Malpractice-Evidence.-Although physician administering an electroshock treatment testified that he used three
nurses because he "felt that three nurses were necessary in
order to properly restrain the plaintiff," the mere fact that
only two rather than three nurses may have been used would
not necessarily show that a reasonable standard of practice
had been violated, the whole matter of restraint being in a
state of great flux, with from one to five nurses being used
by various practitioners depending on whether they felt that
an absolute minimum or maximum of restraint was the important thing.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. David Coleman, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for bodily assault and for negligent
administration of an electroshock treatment. Judgment for
defendants affirmed.
Fred Girard and Joseph D. Flaum for Appellant.
Reed & Kirtland, David Sosson, Henry E. Kappler and
Fred 0. Reed for Respondents.
SCHAUER, .I.-Plaintiff, a mentally ill person appearing
by guardian ad litem, appeals from an adverse judgment
entered upon a directed verdict in his action to recover damages from defendants for alleged bodily assault and negligence in administering an electroshock treatment to plaintiff. We have concluded that, contrary to plaintiff's contention, the trial court's determination that he was not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
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correct and that, although the evidence be viewed in the
light most favorable to plaintiff and conflicts disregarded
(see Huffman v. Lindquist (1951), 37 Cal.2d 465, 468-469
[234 P.2d 34]; Lashley v. Koerber (1945), 26 Cal.2d 83, 8485 [156 P.2d 441] ) , defendants' motion for directed verdict
was properly granted. It follows that the judgment should
be affirmed.
Plaintiff was 31 years of age at the time of the treatment
of which he here complains. He became mentally ill in .August, 1936, at the age of 19, and since then has continued
to suffer from chronic schizophrenia with hebephrenic and
paranoid features with progressive mental deterioration . .After
being cared for at his father's direction in various homes
and sanitariums he was, in 1944, committed to Camarillo
State Hospital, hereinafter termed Camarillo, which is under
the supervision of the Department of Mental Hygiene 1 (W elf.
& Inst. Code, § 154), hereinafter termed the Department.
He remained at Camarillo until August 8, 1947, when he was
paroled to, and by Camarillo transported to, J_jos .Angeles
Neurological Institute, 2 hereinafter termed the Institute,
under the father's agreement that he would care for and
maintain plaintiff and, upon request, cause plaintiff's return to Camarillo at the father's own expense. Three days
later, .August 11, 1947, the father, with permission of the
Institute, took plaintiff for an automobile ride, but failed
to return plaintiff thereto until August 29, 1948. In the
meantime plaintiff had been kept for various periods at the
father's home, in a sanitarium and in a hospital. .At the
hospital a brain operation known as a lobotomy was performed by Dr. Seletz on June 27, 1948, with the father's
consent. (This lobotomy is mentioned here only as a relevant incident in plaintiff's medical history.)
The history given by Dr. Seletz states that the patient
"has stereotyped behavior-will not answer questions. He
has no discipline and continues to ramble in his speech . . .
1
Also known as the Department of Institutions (Welf. & Inst. Code,
151.5).
•Los Angeles Neurological Institute is the name under which the
defenda.nt Olkon-Wayne, Inc., a corporation, is alleged to have conducted its business, and David :M:. Olkon and George J. Wayne are
alleged to have been employes of the corporation. Dr. Wayne testified that both Dr. Olkon and he were directors of tlte corporation and
of the Institute. Other persons named as defendants participated as
nurses in giving the treatment alleged to have been negligently administered.

~
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his thoughts are disjointed. . . . He refuses to use water to
wash with since he states it is too costly. He will not bathe,
and will not use the toilet. . . . He has had some 80 shock
therapy treatments, both in private hospitals and at Camarillo State Hospital. . . . '' Following the lobotomy plaintiff was cared for in his father's home, but his condition
gradually deteriorated, and he became more readily upset
and disturbed. After consulting with Dr. Seletz, who suggested that following a lobotomy "sometimes they gave shock
treatments,'' the father returned plaintiff to the Institute
on the evening of August 29, 1948, and at that time discussed with defendant Dr. Wayne, who is one of the directors of the Institute, plaintiff's agitated and confused behavior and Dr. Seletz' suggestion of shock treatment, and
"asked Dr. Wayne to see what he could do to help the boy."
The father also signed a written consent to administration of
the electric shock therapy.
Dr. Wayne, a licensed physician and surgeon who has
specialized in psychiatry since 1940, had examined plaintiff
when the latter had been admitted to the Institute in 1947
and was aware of his condition and the history of his treatment since then, including the lobotomy. Following further
examination of plaintiff Dr. Wayne diagnosed his condition
as the same as before, except worse, and on August 30, 1948,
administered a shock treatment to him. Dr. Wayne testified
that immediately after that treatment "there seemed to be
evidence of a favorable response, and ordinarily we have
found it good practice to skip a day in between each treatment . . . to observe the reaction to the individual treatment. . . . '' Pursuant to this practice a second treatment
was given to plaintiff on September 1, but between five and
ten seconds after the current was applied and while plaintiff
was in a convulsive state a snapping or "crunching" sound
was heard by Dr. Wayne and the attending nurses. Dr.
Wayne, suspecting fractures of the patient's bones, ordered
X rays, and it was discovered that both femur bones had
broken close to the heads. Plaintiff was thereupon taken to
Temple Hospital for treatment of the fractures, and was kept
in hospitals and at his father's home until March, 1949,
when at the request of the Department the father returned
him to Camarillo. Following the fractures, plaintiff's hips
have become permanently deformed.
As grounds for reversal, plaintiff contends that as he was
an incompetent without understanding and at the time of
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the shock treatment here involved had no court appointed
guardian, the treatment was administered without any authorized consent thereto on plaintiff's behalf and therefore
as a matter of law constituted an assault. Plaintiff further
contends that the case should have gone to the jury on the
issue of negligence, both under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and because the evidence allegedly would support a
finding that defendants negligently failed to properly and
adequately restrain plaintiff's body when the treatment was
given.
Some 450 patients are paroled from Camarillo each month.
In 1947 plaintiff's father requested that plaintiff be paroled.
The request for parole was taken up at a meeting of the
hospital's staff of physicians in April, 1947, and after considering the plaintiff's "hopeless mental condition" and unfortunate personal habits an "indefinite parole direct to licensed mental sanitarium'' was recommended. The father
upon being informed that "I should find a licensed place,"
made arrangements for plaintiff to be cared for at the Institute, which is a mental hospital licensed under section
5700 et sequitur, of the ·welfare and Institutions Code and
under division XP of the rules and regulations of the Department (which were introduced into evidence). The father
also signed the customary parole agreement or "bond" with
the Medical Superintendent of Camarillo, which provides that
the father ''does hereby accept custody of said patient, with
the understanding that he will continue under the jurisdiction of the Division of Extramural Care of the State Department of Institutions. It is further agreed to care for and
maintain him and to see that he is promptly returned to the
Hospital without any expense to the State in the event return is found necessary or advisable, or is recommended by
the Division of Extramural Care." Plaintiff was thereupon,
on August 8, 1947, "paroled to Los Angeles Neurological
Institute'' for an indefinite period and was taken to the
Institute, as related hereinabove.
An officer of Camarillo testified that at the time plaintiff
was paroled it was customary for parolees "to be furnished
medical care by either a State licensed institution or the
person to whom they were paroled,'' and that the Depart"This division deals with the establishing, licensing, inspecting, management, conduct, and personnel of private institutions for the care
of insane and incompetent persons.
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ment ''looked to the person to whom the patient was paroled
to furnish the custodial care and also the medical care as
they might require . . . "; that plaintiff "was paroled to the
Los Angeles Neurological Institute and to no one else," and
that both the Institute and the father had the responsibility
to see that plaintiff had such medical care and maintenance
as he might require. 'fhe witness further stated that the
Department knew that the Institute was ''a licensed mental
hospital at the time . . . . And . . . a place where medical
and psychiatric care could be furnished,'' and affirmed that
as specified by rule 10 of division XI of the Department's
rules and regulations ''All patients who are confined or
reside in llicensed, private J institutions, except those whose
religious beliefs are in opposition to the receiving of medical
attention, must be supervised and visited by a regularly licensed physician, and treatment must be outlined and shown
in the records'' ;4 that from the time plaintiff was paroled
to the Institute in August, 1947, until the parole was terminated by the Department in March, 1949, there was "in accordance with the last agreement signed [by the father J at
the time he [plaintiff] left [Camarillo] '' no other place authorized to furnish medical care to plaintiff except the Institute.
The superintendent of Camarillo "may grant a parole or
leave of absence to a patient under general conditions prescribed by the Department." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6726.)
'fhe conditions prescribed by the Department are found in
rule 21 of division III of its rules and regulations, and include provisions that the person and the place to which the
patient shall be paroled must be specified, that the Department may transfer the patient from time to time as may
seem most beneficial to the patient, and that "No person
shall have the authority to change the conditions of any
parole without full approval of the Department." Plaintiff
does not suggest that the superintendent did not exercise
a proper discretion in paroling him to the Institute, nor that
the 28 shock treatments which the record shows were administered to plaintiff by Camarillo were unauthorized (indeed, plaintiff concedes that the superintendent is directed
4
Rule 10 also provides that "Records of the reception and care of
patients in private institutions shall be kept with details as to all
incidents, restraint, physical and mental treatment. These records
shall be open to inspection by the Department of Institutions or any
other authorized agent."
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by section 6559 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to
treat the patients), but it is contended that because plaintiff was an incompetent adult rather than a minor neither
his father nor the Institute could lawfully consent to or
administer such treatments and, hence, that the treatment
administered by Dr. Wayne and the Institute, constituted
an unlawful assault and battery.
In the first place, it is apparent from the testimony of
the Camarillo officer quoted hereinabove, as well as from
the Department's rules and regulations, that when a patient
is paroled it is contemplated and customary that he receive
appropriate medical treatment in- the licensed and inspected
institution to which he is transferred, and that under the
terms of the parole and the father's agreement here involved
both the Institute and the father had the responsibility of
seeing that plaintiff received necessary treatment. [1] Moreover a father is required under the law to care for and maintain an incompetent adult child ( Civ. Code, § 206; see, also,
Anderson v. Anderson (1899), 124 Cal. 48, 54-55 [56 P. 630,
57 P. 81, 71 Am.St.Rep. 17]). [2] It also appears to
be the general rule that "In case of an emergency a surgeon may operate on a [minor] child without waiting for
authority from the parents . . . where it appears impracticable to secure it,'' but that in the absence of an emergency the parent of such a child may lawfully consent to
the operation. (See 70 C.J.S., p. 968.) [3] We are of
the view that where an adult child is incompetent and has
no legally appointed guardian the right to consent to such
treatment resides in the parent who has the legal responsibility to maintain such child. [4] Under the circumstances
here shown we are persuaded that the Institute and Dr.
Wayne were justified in proceeding with the tre<ftments in
reliance both upon the terms of plaintiff's parole and upon
the signed consent of the father, and that plaintiff's claim
that Rtwh trPatllJ<'nts eonstitutP(1 an nn lawful assault or
battery upon his body is without foundation. Cases relied
upon by plaintiff (see JJfarkart v. Zeimer (1924), 67 Cal.
App. 363, 367 [227 P. 683] ; lnderbitzen v. Lane Hospital
(1932), 124 Cal.App. 462, 467-468 [12 P.2d 744, 13 P.2d
905]; Valdez v. Percy (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 485, 491 [96
P.2d 142]; Estrada v. Orwitz (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 54
[170 P.2d 43]; Hively v. Higgs (1927), 120 Ore. 588 [253
P. 363, 53 A.L.R. 1052] ; Pratt v. Davis (1906), 224 Ill.
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300 [79 N.E. 562, 7 L.R.A.N.S. 609]) involve situations
where treatment was given or acts performed either without any authorized consent whatsoever or which went beyond the consent given, and are not controlling here.
[5] Section 5750 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
which prohibits the detainment in a private mental institution
of an involuntary patient except upon the certificate of a
doctor who has no financial interest in the institution, obviously does not apply where, as here, the patient is paroled
direct to such institution by the Department of Institutions.
[6] It further appears that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may not be invoked by plaintiff. That doctrine
applies in medical malpractice cases only where a layman is
able to say as a matter of common knowledge and observation, or from the evidence can draw an inference, that the
consequences of professional treatment were not such as
ordinarily would have followed if due care had been exercised
(see Engelking v. Carlson (1939), 13 Cal.2d 216,221 [88 P.2d
695]), and it was in such situations that plaintiff was held
entitled to the benefit of the doctrine in Ybarra v. Spangard
(1944), 25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258],
Dierman v. P1·ovidence Hospital (1947), 31 Cal.2d 290 [188
P.2d 12], and Cavero v. Franklin Gen. Benevolent Soc.
(1950), 36 Cal.2d 301 [223 P.2d 471], upon which plaintiff
here relies. Thus, in the Ybarra case, plaintiff while unconscious on an operating table received injuries to a healthy
part of his body, not subject to treatment or within the area
covered by the operation, from instrumentalities used in the
treatment; in Dierman plaintiff was injured when an explosion occurred close to her face or in her respiratory tract
while the surgeon was cauterizing a nose wound with a hot
electric needle; and in Cavero the infant patient died while
undergoing a tonsillectomy under the influence of a gas
anesthetic, and the evidence of the medical experts prima
facie established that ''except for infected tonsils and adenoids
and a slight temperature due to such infection, the child was
normal and healthy,'' that the death was not due to any preexisting condition, and that death under such circumstances
ordinarily does not occur when the operation is performed
with due care and skill, i.e., in the absence of negligence;
and, hence, it was held, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant an inference of negligence could be drawn by the
trier of facts.
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[7] By contrast the undisputed testimony of both defendant Dr. \Vayne and the witness Dr. Thompson in the
instant case established that electroshock treatment is designed to have ''an effect upon the entire body. The entire
body is actually thrown into a convulsive state, and the aim
and hope, of course, is that this convulsion, and all of the
biochemical changes that occur with this type of convulsion,
will produce a helpful and beneficial effect upon the patient's
mental condition"; that "the most frequent, the most usual
and the most common hazard which is germane, which is
inherent in the method of treatment, is fractures. There
are certain other hazards, and, indeed, there are some cases
in which death has actually resulted, directly from the hazard
germane to the treatment, but these are the calculated risks
of the treatment . . . . [11']ractures occur as the result of
muscle tension, whether it is in shock treatment or from
stepping off of a curb . . . and in shock treatment there is
muscle tension, which is a part of the treatment, and therefore . . . fracture becomes a calculated and even an expected
risk of the treatment. . . . [T] here is a certain percentage
of fractures which occurs notwithstanding any kind of precaution or care that can be taken to prevent it . . . . The
area of fracture is completely unpredictable . . . . [T]he overall incidence of fractures in shock treatment varies anywhere
from perhaps one-half to about three and a half per cent.
If one considers fractures of the spine . . . the incidence is''
between 10 and 40 per cent. Dr. Wayne's ''surmise . . . In
retrospect" was that plaintiff's legs broke because "nutritional disturbances consequent upon long-standing mental
illness affected bony structures''; the machine used in giving
the treatment was a standard type, "one of the best; certainly
one of the most expensive'' and in good working order and
''perfect condition'' ; when the ''machine is out of order it
becomes almost immediately apparent." Under such circumstances the trial court correctly concluded that the opinions
of experts are required to evaluate the procedures and hazards
of shock therapy in any particular case and that here neither
does the expert testimony directly show (by the opinion of
a competent witness to that effect) that there was any lack
of due care or skill in the conduct of defendants, nor does
the evidence show any combination of facts and expert opinion
from which a layman can draw the inference that the consequences of the treatment administered to plaintiff were
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not such as ordinarily, i.e., normally, may follow if due care
has been exercised. Accordingly, no basis for invoking the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was established. The same conclusion upon similar facts was reached by the court in
Qtlinley v. Cocke ( 1946), 183 'l'enn. 428 [192 S.W.2d 992].
[8] Plaintiff's final contention-that defendants' own evidence would support a finding of negligence-is ingenious but
utterly lacking in merit. The evidence relied upon is as follows: Dr. 'Wayne and three nurses testified at the trial that
all three of such nurses assisted in restraining plaintiff during
the treatment; there was no testimony that less than three
nurses, or that any number of nurses other than three, participated in the treatment; there was, however, a conflict
between the testimony referred to above as adduced at the
trial and the testimony of Dr. ·wayne and two of the nurses
as originally given upon the taking of their depositions
(subsequently corrected) as to the identity of one of the three
participating nurses. Plaintiff argues that this original (later
corrected and eliminated) conflict indicates that actually only
two nurses assisted and that since Dr. Wayne thought it
best to use three nurses it was negligent to use less than
three. In drawing these factual inferences plaintiff strains
too heavy a haul upon too thin a trace; it cannot support
even an appellate court's appraisal of what could be substantial in a trial court.
Even if it were assumed that only two nurses rather than
three were used in plaintiff's case, it would not appear that
a reasonable standard of practice had been violated. The
only evidence as to the standard of practice was supplied by
defendants. It is that "the whole matter of restraint . . . is
in a state of great flux,'' with from one to five nurses being
used by various practitioners, and that ''There are some who
restrain legs and some who do not restrain the legs at ~ll .
. . . For example, some therapists felt that an absolute minimum of restraint was the important thing; others have felt
that an absolute maximum of restraint was the important
thing, and there were all gradations in between.'' Dr.
IN ayne followed a middle course as he felt that ''a mild to
moderate amount of manual restraint should be used." "Under the practice . . . in the case where the one nurse was
used to assist the doctor . . . the upper portion . . . of the
anatomy would be restrained . . . , the lower extremities were
allowed to move without any restraint.''
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Plaintiff stresses that Dr. Wayne testified that in plaintiff's
ease he used three nurses because he "felt that three nurses
IYere necessary in order to properly restrain the plaintiff.''
In response to the question by plaintiff's counsel, "YVhat
dangers did you apprehend that these nurses might be able
to relieve against or guard against in the way of restraint?''
Dr. Wayne replied, "The specific danger would be too gross
movement of the legs." Dr. ·wayne further stated that "in
accordance with the standard of practice in 1948, that danger
was common knowledge to all practitioners," with the q nalification that one group of practitioners believed "that there
is danger of bone breakage and injury if restraint is used on
too gross movements," that another group believed "that if
restraint is not used there is danger of bone breakage and
muscular injury,'' and that a third gToup of practitioners,
with whom Dr. 'vVayne agreed, stood in between; that within
the standards ''individual patients require different amounts
of restraint" and "under the standard" preferred by Dr.
·wayne he "felt that George Farber required three nurses,"
disposed one at the extremities and two at the shoulders of
the patient, but he did not believe "that with less than three
nurses there was [more] danger of bone breakage . . . and
the reason for it is that I use two and three nurses just as
frequently. In this particular case in question, I used three
. . . I think it would have been possible to use two nurses,
as I check matters before and since. In other words, a question
of two or three here is not a crucial question . . . ''
Furthermore, it is to be noted that all of the testimony
on the subject is to the effect that two nurses were stationed
at plaintiff's shoulders (one at each shoulder), and that a third
nurse stood at plaintiff's feet holding his ankles. The testimony
relied upon by plaintiff as constituting a conflict concerned
the identity of one of the nurses standing at plaintiff's
shoulders, and there is no suggestion in the record or evidence
upon which an inference could be drawn by laymen that
plaintiff's ankles were not under restraint during the treatment, or that the use of only one nurse instead of two at
plaintiff's shoulders would have constituted a negligent contribution to the fracturing of his femurs.
Pathetic and heartrendingly grievous as is the plight of
plaintiff-and his loyal father-there appears no basis whereby at law and in justice the defendants sued herein can
be held to have violated a duty or to be accountable to
40 C.2d-17
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'!'he faet that what was done with dlH'

to help resulted inRtead in fnrthPr hurt srt<; 11p no ean><f'

of action in tort.
'!'he jn<lgnlf'nt is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J., Edmonds, ,J., 'l'raynor, ,T., and
Spence, J ., concurred.
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent.
l cannot agree with the majority that the doetrine o[ ret::
ipsa loquitur may not be invoked by the plaintiff in this
appalling case. If ever a situation existed where it was more
applicable it has not been called to my attention. We have here
a patient, mentally deficient, undergoing shock treatments to
relieve that mental condition, emerging with both femur bones
broken and a resulting permanent physical deformity.
In Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 489 [154 P.2d 687,
162 A.L.R. 1258], this court said: "The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has three conditions: '(1) the accident must be
of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.' (Prosser,
'forts, p. 295.) It is applied in a wide variety of situations,
including cases of medical or dental treatment and hospital
care. (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82 [64 f.2d 409] ; Brown v.
Shor-tl·idge, 98 Cal.App. 352 [277 P. 134]; Moor-e v. Steen,
102 Cal.App. 723 [283 P. 833]; Armstr-ong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.
App.2d 429 [47 P.2d 740]; Meyer v. McNutt Hospital, 173
Cal. 156 [159 P. 436]; Ver-geldt v. Hartzell, 1 F.2d 633;
lllaki v. 1llurray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251 [7 P.2d 228]; Whetstine v. Mor-avec, 228 Iowa 352 [291 N.W. 425] ; see Shain,
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 187, 196.)
'"!'here is, however, some uncertainty as to the extent
to which res ipsa loquitur may be invoked in cases of injury from medical treatment. This is in part due to the
tendency, in some decisions, to lay undue emphasis on the
limitations of the doctrine, and to give too little attention
to its basic underlying purpose. 'l'he result has been that
a simple, understandable rule of circumstantial evidence,
with a sottnd background of common sense a.nd human exper-ience, has occasionally been transformed into a rigid legal
formula, which arbitrarily precludes its application in rnany
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cases where it is most important that it should be applied.
If the doctrine is to contimw to serve a useful purpose, we
should not forget that 'the particular force and justice of
the rule, regarded as a presumption throwing ttpon the party
charged the duty of producing evidence, consists in the circumstance that the ch·ief evidence of the true cause, whether
culpable or innocent, is p·ractically access·ible to him but inaccessible to the injttred person.' (9 Wigmore, Evidence
[3d ed.J, § 2509, p. 382 . . . . " (Emphasis added.)
In the Ybarra case, the plaintiff was to have an appendectomy. He emerged from the anesthetic with an injured
i-ihoulder from which he developed a paralysis and atrophy
of the muscles surrounding it. This case the majority seeks
to distinguish on the ground that he received injury to a
healthy part of his body not within the area to be covered
by the operation. Does not that same fact prevail here?
Plaintiff was to be treated for a mental condition and
emerged with fractured femurs.
To say that the doctrine was applicable and an instruction thereon should have been given, is not to say that every
time the doctrine is invoked, the person relying thereon is
entitled to recover damages. All that the law requires is,
that the defendant charged with negligence rebut the inference of negligence by giving a reasonable explanation of
the cause of the injury. This is as it should be in a situation where the instrumentality causing the injury is within
the exclusive control of the defendant, or his agents, aud
particularly so where, as here, a plaintiff was unconsciom
and, even had he not been mentally incompetent, completely
unable to testify as to what occurred. As was said in the
Ybarra case "the particular force and justice of the rule
. . . consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence of
the true eause, whether cttlpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to him rthe defendant l but inaccessible to thf'
injured person." (Emphasis added.)
With respect to the confusion as to whether there had
been two or three nurses holding plaintiff on the table during the shock treatment, I cannot refrain from noting with
amusement, a quotation from the testimony of defendant,
Dr. Wayne. He is reported as saying, in part, "I think it
would have been possible to use two nnrses, as I check matters before and since. In other words, a question of two or
three here is not a crucial question . .. .'' (Emphasis added.)
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Since when has it been necessary for a defendant to point
out to a court and jury what is a crucial question in a case~
I am also amused at the statement in the majority opinion
that ''Pathetic and heartrendingly grievous as is the plight
of plaintiff-and his loyal father-there appears no basis
whereby at law and in justice the defendants sued herein
can be held to have violated a duty or to be accountable to
plaintiff in damages.'' As I have heretofore pointed out, invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a case such
as this is not only proper, but the fair, just and equitable
thing to do. And, had the doctrine been invoked, and an
instruction given thereon, the heartbroken majority of this
court would merely have been declaring the law, not transgressing it.
I would reverse the judgment in the hope that justice might
be done on a retrial of the cause.
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SARA JANE TALBOT DIMON, Respondent, v. CHARLES
GRAYSON DIMON, Appellant.
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Existence of Marital Status
as Prerequisite.-In this state a wife's right to recover alimony or support is limited to the period when the parties
are husband and wife.
[2] Id.- Temporary Alimony- Jurisdiction.- Language of Civ.
Code, §§ 136, 137, 139, shows a consistent legislative purpose
to confine powers of court to decree support to the period
when actions for divorce, annulment and separate maintenance
are pending, including time on appeal and such further time
as may be within scope of decree in the particular action.
[3] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Application.-An application for
alimony is a collateral proceeding or episode within the divorce action, authorized for a particular purpose, but dependent for its maintenance on existence of the action.
[4:] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Jurisdiction.-Court has no jurisdiction to make an award for alimony to a wife who previMcK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Divorce, § 198; [2] Divorce, § 178;
[3] Divorce, §181; [4] Divorce, §200; [6,11] Parent and Child,
§ 28; [7] Parent and Child, § 36; [8] Parent and Child, § 30;
[9] Divorce, § 295; [10] Divorce, §§ 295, 296; [12] Parent and
Child, § 26; [13] Husband and Wife, § 178.

